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certainly the media's interest in the case was unlike anything that had been seen before in the UK. After the Divisional Court held that the government needed parliamentary authorisation to trigger Article 50, 3 the three judges who decided the case faced visceral attacks from some people who thought the decision to withdraw had already been made in the referendum. Grossly misleading newspaper articles in the Daily Express and the Daily Mail among others, which had campaigned for the UK to leave the EU ('Brexit'), described the judges as having 'blocked Brexit' and, chillingly, as 'enemies of the people '. 4 Troubled by this misunderstanding of the case, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, the President of the Supreme Court, opened the hearing of the government's appeal, which was broadcast live on the BBC News and Sky News channels, with a statement designed in part to depoliticise the case. 'The Supreme Court exists to decide points of law which fall within its jurisdiction,' Lord Neuberger reassured the audience. 'This appeal is concerned with legal issues, and as judges, our duty is to consider those issues impartially and to decide the case according to the law. That is what we will do.' 5 The Divisional Court had made the same point at the beginning of its judgment: 'It deserves emphasis at the outset that the court in these proceedings is only dealing with a pure question of law.' 6 But deciding questions of law is not all that judges do in fulfilling their judicial role. Or more precisely, at least in common law systems such as the UK's, judges do not merely have a duty to interpret and apply the law. They also have a power to develop and change the law, a power which arises most uncontroversially when the law does not fully determine the court's decision. This indeterminacy in the law does not arise because there is disagreement about what the law requires. Disagreement about the law, far from entailing that there is no legally right answer, presupposes that there is a legally right 3 answer. In disagreeing about what the right answer is we presuppose that there is a right answer worth disagreeing about. However, sometimes our reasoning drives us to the conclusion that there is no uniquely right answer. 7 When the law runs out in this sense, it leaves a gap in which the court must choose between competing decisions, each of which is legally permissible but not required. In such cases, the court does not merely apply the law, but develops it, changing the law by making it more determinate-a development which requires the court to consider principles from outside the law.
R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union
In the Miller case, the Supreme Court was faced with a question on which the constitutional requirements were indeterminate, which entailed a choice between constitutionally permissible decisions. Yet that is not how the Supreme Court viewed the matter. Sitting for the first time en banc, the Supreme Court held, by a majority of eight to three, that the established requirements of the constitution did not give the government authority to trigger the process of leaving the EU without an Act of Parliament conferring that authority. On a secondary issue, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the consent of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland was not legally required before starting the process of leaving the EU, and that it was not open to the Court to develop the law to make it a legal requirement.
In my view, the majority's reasoning does not support their conclusion on the first issue. But that is not to say that their conclusion cannot be justified on other grounds. As far as the legal grounds are concerned, the minority, and especially Lord Reed, convincingly explained that there were no existing legal requirements prohibiting the Crown from deciding to withdraw from the EU and notifying the European Council of that intention. But arguably the minority paid insufficient attention to the question of whether the court should have developed the law in a way that supports the majority's conclusion. Perhaps that is because the majority gave no cogent reason for such a development, believing they had found a right answer in the existing law. The majority's conclusion can be justified only if it would have been morally and politically illegitimate for the executive, which is accountable to Parliament, to have the power to decide to withdraw from the EU without express parliamentary authorisation. As we shall see, defending that conclusion is more difficult than the majority assumed.
II. THE MAIN ISSUE IN MILLER
The main issue for the Supreme Court in Miller was whether the royal prerogative provided the government with the authority to start the process of withdrawing from the EU. Counsel for the claimants argued that the prerogative did not extend to withdrawing from the EU, and so it was not necessary to show that Parliament had expressly prohibited a power that does not exist; rather, the government needed to show that Parliament had conferred a statutory power, which it had not. Counsel for the Secretary of State conceded that Parliament had not conferred a statutory power, but argued that the foreign affairs prerogative did include the power to withdraw from the EU, and that Parliament had done nothing to take that power away. The disagreement, therefore, was centrally about the scope of the foreign affairs prerogative, and whether it extended to the decision to withdraw from the EU.
Some commentators, however, have doubted whether the government was right to concede that the government lacked a statutory power to withdraw from the EU. They make the surprising claim that the power to withdraw under This argument is flawed for at least two main reasons. First, as the majority in the Supreme Court pointed out, Article 50 'operates only on the international plane'-that is, it is not (as section 2(1) puts it) 'to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom'-and so 'is not therefore brought into UK law through section 2 of the 1972 Act'.
12 Secondly, even if it were applicable in domestic law, Article 50 refers to a Member State's own constitutional requirements-that is, its existing requirements-and leaves those requirements unchanged. It leaves unanswered the question: under the Member State's constitution, who is permitted or required to make the decision to withdraw from the EU? In the UK, the executive has the power to conduct foreign affairs, but the question-which is not answered by Article 50, even if it had been brought into domestic law (which it had not)-is whether there are any constitutional requirements that limit this power, such that it does not extend to the decision to withdraw from the EU.
So the question is about of the foreign affairs prerogative. Under that prerogative, the government may, among other things, 'negotiate, conclude, construe, observe, breach, repudiate or terminate a treaty.' 13 The effect of this power is that the Crown can 'irrevocably bind the nation'.
14 That is, the treaty will 'bind the nation'-or, more accurately, the state-under international law, but it will not give rise to any rights and duties in domestic law, until it is incorporated into domestic law by an Act of Parliament. This is the dualist approach: the executive can create legal obligations on the international plane, but only an Act of Parliament can incorporate those international obligations into domestic law. The corollary, in this simplified picture, is that the executive can extinguish international legal obligations, but only an Act of Parliament can extinguish the obligations that have been incorporated into domestic law.
11 Craig (n 9) 1048. The central question in Miller was: do the special features of EU law-which gives rise to 'directly effective' rights enforceable in the domestic courts (what the 1972 Act calls 'enforceable EU rights')-affect the scope of the government's prerogative power in relation to EU treaties, with the result that the prerogative does not include the power to withdraw from those treaties? The majority answered this question in the affirmative. It did not go quite so far as to say that the prerogative power could not be used to change EU law, and hence to change enforceable EU rights under the 1972 Act. Instead, the majority drew a distinction between the prerogative power to contribute to the process of changing EU law (which the majority 'readily accept[ed]' exists) and the prerogative power to withdraw from the EU (which the majority held does not exist).
15 The majority's distinction raises two questions: Was it required by an application of existing constitutional law? If not, was majority right to develop constitutional law to make it a requirement?
III. PRECEDENT AND THE PREROGATIVE
The majority in Miller presented their judgment as an application of constitutional law expounded during the developments of the seventeenth century. In the Case of Proclamations, Sir Edward Coke told King James I that 'the king by his proclamation or other ways cannot change any part of the common law, or statute, or the customs of the realm.'
16 It would be an exaggeration to say that, after this case, the courts always backed Parliament when asked to adjudicate on the balance of power between the Crown and Parliament. 17 The rule that there is no prerogative power to alter the law of the land does not entail that the prerogative cannot alter legal rights and duties under the law of the land. Indeed, one of the twentieth century's leading public lawyers, Sir William Wade, went so far as to say that the prerogative power should be defined as a legal power 'to alter people's rights, duties or status under the laws of this country which the courts of this country enforce.' 22 That may have been too broad, but Supreme Court in Miller acknowledged that the prerogative power could at least change people's legal rights in some circumstances-for example, the Crown's power to alter civil servants' terms of service-but the majority was keen to stress that, when there is a prerogative power to change legal rights, 'it does not change the law, because the law has always authorised the exercise of the power.' 23 The law does not authorise the exercise of the treatymaking power to alter people's rights and duties under domestic law.
24
Under the dualist approach, as already mentioned, while treaties are not without legal effect-for even unincorporated treaties are used as 19 24 It was for this reason that Wade doubted whether the treaty-making power is a prerogative power: see Wade (n 22) 47, arguing that treaty-making is 'merely a piece of administrative action on the international plane', and that it 'is not an act of power in any British constitutional sense, since it involves no special power that a British court will recognise.' See also HWR Wade, 'Procedure and Prerogative in Public Law ' (1985) 101 Law Quarterly Review 180, 193: 'the treaty-making power is surely a non-prerogative, since the making of a treaty, by itself, cannot alter the law of the land. ' an aid to statutory interpretation-they do not directly affect legal rights and duties until incorporated by an Act of Parliament.
But EU law has a special status. The UK joined a 'new legal order ' in 1973, and [T]rue it is that every precedent hath a commencement; but where authority and precedent is wanting there is need of great consideration before that anything of novelty be established, and to provide that this be not against the law of the land.
29
The novelty of the EU legal order is no reason to deny that the law allows a prerogative power to change enforceable EU rights. In any case, the majority does not deny this point. Instead, the majority [W]hen the Act deals with something which before the Act could be effected by the prerogative, and specifically empowers the Crown to do the same thing, but subject to conditions, the Crown assents to that, and by that Act, to the prerogative being curtailed.
31
This principle was extended further in Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade, which concerned the Crown's treaty-making powers and provides the most promising basis for the Miller claimants' central proposition. 32 In 1972, Laker Airways wished to operate a transatlantic service between London and New York. To do so, it was required to fulfil two conditions: first, it had to obtain a licence under the Civil Aviation Act 1971; secondly, it had to be approved by both the United States and the United Kingdom governments, under a 1946 treaty known as the Bermuda Agreement. Laker Airways was granted a licence by the Civil Aviation Authority, and was awaiting designation under the Bermuda Agreement, when a newly elected Labour government sought to use its prerogative power to cancel the airline's landing rights under the Bermuda Agreement. The case did not fall within the De Keyser's principle, because the statutory scheme for granting licences was meant to be used in conjunction with the prerogative power to obtain landing rights from the United States. However, the Court of Appeal in Laker Airways held that the government could not use its prerogative so as to deprive Laker Airways 'of the protection which the statute affords them.'
33
Given that the 1971 Act did not empower the Secretary of State to revoke the licence except in circumstances falling within section 4 of that Act (which did not apply in that case), he could not deprive the airline of the use of its licence by other means, namely the prerogative. 34 This principle can be generalised: the law does not allow the prerogative to frustrate a statute, and-significantly-this principle has been taken to apply even when the relevant statutory provisions have not been brought into force. 35 Whether a prerogative power would frustrate a statute is essentially a question of statutory interpretation.
The Miller case does not fall within either the De Keyser's principle or the Laker Airways principle. Most obviously, the 1972 Act did not empower the Crown to withdraw from the EU subject to conditions. Nor, as I shall explain in the next two sections, would withdrawing from the EU frustrate the 1972 Act or any other legislation. As Paul Craig says, the Miller case does not so much extend as 'radically change' the De Keyser's principle. 36 The central proposition defended by the claimants in Miller was that there can be no prerogative power to alter or withdraw from a treaty if to do so would affect rights that had been incorporated into domestic law. 'There is,' Craig rightly points out, 'no case that comes close to establishing this proposition.'
37
The Divisional Court had previously considered and rejected a very similar proposition. In R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex party Rees-Mogg, the applicant, a former editor of The Times, sought a declaration that it would be unlawful for the Crown to ratify the Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. 38 Like Miller, this challenge received much media attention, and was described by the applicant as the most 33 ibid 707 (Lord Denning MR). important constitutional case for three centuries.
39 Lord Rees-Mogg's counsel, David Pannick QC, now also a peer, argued that the Crown's prerogative power to conclude treaties could not be used to change EU law, because that had been given effect in domestic law through the 1972 Act.
The Divisional Court in Rees-Mogg rejected that argument. As we shall see, the 1972 Act, and subsequent legislation to 'make provision consequential on' EU treaties, 40 reflected the traditional dualist approach and Parliament's limited role. Thus, as Richard Rawlings noted shortly after the Rees-Mogg judgment, any legal challenge to these 'orthodox views of constitutional requirement is immediately confronted with the difficult task of throwing over a whole legal framework incorporating and founded upon those views.'
41 For this reason, Lloyd LJ, giving the judgment of the Divisional Court, ruled that the 1972 Act did not fetter the prerogative power 'to alter or add to the EEC Treaty':
When Parliament wishes to fetter the Crown's treatymaking power in relation to Community law, it does so in express terms, such as one finds in section 6 of the Act of 1978. Indeed, as was pointed out, if the Crown's treaty-making power were impliedly excluded by section 2(1) of the Act of 1972, section 6 of the Act of 1978 would not have been necessary.
42
By avoiding a serious engagement with the applicant's arguments, the Divisional Court avoided an attempt to move the court 'towards innovative and creative constitutional adjudication.' After losing in the Divisional Court, Lord Rees-Mogg's counsel believed he had a stronger chance of winning in the higher courts, 44 but the case was not appealed due to a lack of further financial backing. Yet Lord Pannick QC, who was also counsel for Mrs Miller, eventually succeeded in persuading the three judges in the Divisional Court and eight Justices of the Supreme Court. Crucial to that victory in Miller, it seems, was persuading the court that his main argument did not require any creativity, but was merely an orthodox application of established rules of constitutional law. How did he do that?
IV. THE EFFECT OF EU LAW IN DOMESTIC LAW
In his dissenting judgment in Miller, Lord Reed accurately summarised the effect of the 1972 Act when he wrote:
[T]he effect which Parliament has given to EU law in our domestic law, under the 1972 Act, is inherently conditional on the application of the EU treaties to the UK, and therefore on the UK's membership of the EU. The Act imposes no requirement, and manifests no intention, in respect of the UK's membership of the EU. It does not, therefore, affect the Crown's exercise of prerogative powers in respect of UK membership. 45 The majority Justices accepted the proposition in the first sentence, stating that section 2 of the 1972 Act makes directly effective EU law part of domestic law 'so long as the United Kingdom is party to the EU Treaties.' 46 Thus, it is accepted that the status of EU law in domestic law depends on two conditions: first, the UK's continuing membership of the EU; secondly, the continuing statutory basis in the 1972 Act. What the majority and minority disagree about is whether the 1972 Act has any implications for the UK's membership of the EU, such that the prerogative is curtailed.
The majority drew attention to the long title of the 1972 Act, which reads: 'An Act to make provision in connection with the enlargement of the European Communities to include the United Kingdom …'. This, the majority said, 'is not easy to reconcile with a prerogative power to achieve the opposite.' 47 However, John Finnis has drawn attention to the contrast between the 1972 Act and the legislation to make provision for the new status of the UK's former colonies, which each contain a long title of the form: 'An Act to make provision for, and in connection with, the attainment by [the former colony] of fully responsible status within the Commonwealth.'
48 The majority read the long title of the 1972 Act as if it made provision 'for, and in connection with,' the enlargement of the European Communities to include the UK. Yet Parliament studiously avoided that formulation, which it had frequently used, and continued to use, in other statutes.
As the majority accepted, the way in which the 1972 Act gave effect to enforceable EU rights in domestic law entailed that those rights could vary 'from time to time'. 49 The question is whether they could vary as a result of the Crown's prerogative power and, if so, whether the Crown has the power to reduce those rights to nil. It is true that, on the basis of existing constitutional principle set out in the previous section, the prerogative cannot be used to alter or revoke rights granted by Parliament. But the inherently conditional nature of the 1972 Act (which, as I said, was accepted by the majority) entails that the rights granted by Parliament are conditional on their continued availability under the EU Treaties. Again, Lord Reed put this point well when he wrote:
If Parliament grants rights on the basis, express or implied, that they will expire in certain circumstances, then no further legislation is needed if those circumstances occur. If those circumstances comprise the UK's withdrawal from a treaty, the rights are not revoked by the Crown's exercise of prerogative powers: they are revoked by the operation of the Act of Parliament itself.
50
The majority's response to this point is very weak. 51 It ultimately depended not on statutory interpretation and Parliament's intention, but on the court's development a new constitutional principle, which we will come to later.
Once the conditional effect of EU law in domestic law is properly understood, many related arguments fall away. For example, it was argued that withdrawal from the EU would deprive UK citizens of the right to vote in elections for the European Parliament, contained in section 8 of the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002. But this right is also inherently conditional on the UK's continued membership of the EU. 52 Withdrawal from the EU would not deprive UK citizens of a right to vote that continues to exist under the (unrepealed) 2002 Act; rather, the statutory right would cease to exist because the circumstances on which its existence depended have ended. That does not entail that the Crown has a prerogative power to withdraw from the EU; however, it does entail that the use of that prerogative would not conflict with the rule derived from the Case of Proclamations, because it would not alter the law of the land.
One possible objection to this analysis, mentioned briefly in the submissions of counsel for the claimants, is that it appears to be inconsistent with section 18 of the European Union Act 2011. On its face, section 18, which is commonly referred to as the 'sovereignty clause', merely declares what the courts had all along acceptednamely, that the status of EU law in domestic law depends on a continuing statutory basis, which Parliament could (expressly) repeal at any time. Counsel for the claimants stressed the word 'only' in this section, which they argued is a strong indication that Parliament intended that EU law's status in domestic law should not also depend on whether the government exercises its prerogative power to withdraw. 55 The essence of this argument is that, just as it was solely for Parliament to give EU law effect in domestic law, so it is solely for Parliament to remove that effect. But this interpretation of section 18 of the 2011 Act-which, despite discussion during the hearing, was not considered in the Supreme Court's judgments-is unsound because it overlooks the fact that the 1972 Act is itself inherently conditional on the UK's continued membership, a point that the majority accepted.
Once it is accepted that the 1972 Act gave effect to EU law on this conditional basis, does it follow that there is a prerogative power to withdraw from the EU? As we saw in the previous section, statutes that confer rights in a conditional way, and that appear to leave the prerogative unscathed, have occasionally been interpreted by the courts as fettering the prerogative. The Laker Airways case is a striking example of this: the exercise of a statutory licence right was, in practical terms, conditional on a designation under a treaty, but the court nonetheless held that the prerogative could not be used to undermine the statutory arrangements for granting licences. If reasoning like this applies to the effect of EU law in domestic law, it would defeat the argument that, as we saw Lloyd LJ claim in ReesMogg, only express restrictions fetter the treaty-making prerogative in relation to EU law.
56 Parliament has explicitly placed extensive restrictions on the prerogative power in relation to EU law, most notably in the European Union Act 2011, but it has placed no express restriction on the executive's exercise of the power to give notice under Article 50(2).
57 Yet Parliament did not need to place an express restriction on this power, if the Laker Airways principle applies in this context-that is, if triggering Article 50 would undermine the effect given to enforceable EU rights in the 1972 Act. Let's consider this argument more closely.
V. THE FRUSTRATION OF PARLIAMENT
The question can be put differently: did the 1972 Act impose an obligation on the government to ratify the accession treaty after the enactment of the 1972 Act? When this question was raised during the hearing, counsel for one of the claimants replied that 'it would have been an abuse of power under Fire Brigades Union principles if there was no ratification.' 58 Lord Carnwath, dissenting, dismissed the relevance of Fire Brigades Union, which he said is 'about abuse, not absence, of power.' 59 But the distinction between questions of scope (whether a prerogative power exists) and questions of abuse (whether an existing prerogative has been properly exercised) is not helpful in either case, which each concern the limits to the government's authority. Fire Brigades Union is highly relevant to the questions raised in Miller, and it provides the most promising-though, in my view, still ultimately flawed-basis for the majority's claim to have been applying existing constitutional law, namely, the principle that the prerogative cannot be used in a way that would frustrate an Act of Parliament. It is striking, therefore, that the majority barely discussed 56 Rees-Mogg (n 38) 567 (Lloyd LJ). The Fire Brigades Union case involved the arrangements for the compensation of victims of violent crime. The Criminal Justice Act 1988 provided for a scheme that would give statutory force to the existing, non-statutory scheme for ex gratia compensation, usually regarded as having been established under the prerogative. Section 171(1) stated that the relevant statutory provisions 'shall come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may … appoint'.
60 Years later, the government decided not to bring the provisions into force, and instead announced that it would use its prerogative to establish a new, less generous tariff scheme. The applicants challenged the government's decision, on the basis that the 1988 Act had fettered the government's prerogative. The House of Lords, by a three-to-two majority, interpreted section 171 as imposing 'a clear duty to keep under consideration from time to time' whether to bring the relevant provisions into force-a duty which was breached by the decision to introduce a different scheme by an exercise of the prerogative.
61 Lord Browne-Wilkinson said:
[I]t would be most surprising if, at the present day, prerogative powers could be validly exercised by the executive so as to frustrate the will of Parliament as expressed in a statute and, to an extent, to pre-empt the decision of Parliament whether or not to continue with the statutory scheme.
62
Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who we saw in Rees-Mogg had rejected the claim that the 1972 Act had fettered the treaty-making prerogative, held in Fire Brigades Union that section 171 should be construed 'so as to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the legislative policy enshrined in sections 108 to 117, even though those sections are not in force.' 63 The minister had discretion to decide when-but not whether-to bring the statutory scheme into force. You can see the suggested analogy between this case and Miller. The statutory scheme for criminal injuries compensation, set out in sections 108 to 117 of the 1988 Act, was not in force (and so did not confer any statutory rights), but nonetheless was held to fetter the prerogative power to alter the existing non-statutory scheme. Similarly, the argument runs, the 1972 Act, though not explicitly requiring the ratification of the accession treaty, fettered the Crown's power in 1972 to decide whether to become, and now whether to remain, a member of the EU. As the Divisional Court put it in Miller, '[t] he effect of the decision in the Fire Brigades Union case was that Parliament could not be taken to have legislated in vain.' 65 However, the Fire Brigades Union case also produced two powerful dissents. The dissenters rejected the majority's view that section 171 imposed a duty that fettered the prerogative. But they also went further. Lord Keith of Kinkel described the majority's decision as a 'most improper' and 'unwarrantable intrusion by the court into the political field and a usurpation of the function of Parliament.' 66 Lord Mustill argued that, except when deciding the lawfulness of executive action, the court 'has no competence to express any opinion on the relationship between the executive and Parliament.' 67 These, and similar, remarks are unfortunate to the extent that they call into question the justiciability of the questions before the court, for there is little doubt that the scope of prerogative powers is a question for the court to resolve. 68 But it was entirely appropriate for them to point out that the abuse of ministerial powers may be better remedied by parliamentary as opposed to judicial controls, that is, by the political rather than legal constitution. 69 The dissenters in Miller were more measured in their criticism of the majority, but they similarly emphasised the executive's accountability to Parliament, Lord Reed noting that it 'is important for courts to understand that the legalisation of political issues is not always constitutionally appropriate '. 70 In both cases, the dissenters' concerns about judicial intervention in political issues were relevant-though perhaps not conclusive-only because they were justified in rejecting the majority's conclusion that Parliament had fettered the prerogative. Gavin Phillipson has argued that the majority's decision in Fire Brigades Union 'was justified by a factor that is arguably not present in the Article 50 case: namely the presence of a straightforward statutory duty on the Minister'.
71 But section 171, the commencement clause, conferred a broad discretion, not a duty. Until the minister exercised his wide discretionary power to bring them into force, the relevant provisions of the statutory scheme granted no enforceable rights to individuals. Moreover, since it was accepted that the minister could take financial considerations into account when considering when to bring the statutory provisions into force, 72 it must surely follow that he could alter the existing non-statutory scheme on similar grounds. 73 Even TRS Allan, a leading modern advocate of greater judicial intervention, has argued that the majority's judgment in Fire Brigades Union was unjustified. 74 The decision may well have served 'to supplement, not supplant, the political constitution', 75 but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it was a supplement that Parliament did not need.
In Miller, the majority's conclusion, which was that the 1972 Act 'is inconsistent with the future exercise by ministers of any prerogative power to withdraw', is similarly difficult to sustain. 76 In making this criticism of the majority, it would be wrong to say that, by adding the Lisbon Treaty (and with it Article 50) to the list of Treaties in section 1 (2) statutory purpose of the 1972 Act, so that the earlier statute's purpose became to make the UK a member of the EU, 'unless the UK decides to leave'. 77 The 1972 Act was conditional from the outset. As the Divisional Court in Miller acknowledged, when enacting the 1972 Act, Parliament must be taken to have had in mind the possibility that the UK might seek to withdraw from the EU. 78 The question, as the Divisional Court said, is 'whether Parliament intended that this should be something that the Crown would be able to do through exercise of its prerogative powers without Parliament's intervention.' 79 On this question, notwithstanding the majority's conclusion, Parliament expressed no view one way or another, in 1972 or at any other time. As Lord Reed explains in his dissenting judgment, at the time of the passage of the 1972 Act it was foreseeable that the accession treaty might not have been ratified, and yet Parliament remained silent on whether ratification was required. 80 The 1972 Act is also consistent with a prerogative power to withdraw. But that is not to say that the court could not develop the common law to impose a constraint on the prerogative-which is in effect what the Supreme Court did.
VI. A MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
For the majority, the status of EU law as a source of domestic law entailed that the treaty-making prerogative 'cannot be exercised in relation to the EU Treaties', regardless of the silence in the 1972 Act: 'rather than the Secretary of State being able to rely on the absence in the 1972 Act of any exclusion of the prerogative power to withdraw from the EU Treaties, the proper analysis is that, unless that Act positively created such a power in relation to those Treaties, it does not exist.' 81 Thus, in light of the foregoing, the majority's conclusion can be restated as follows: the prerogative cannot be used to remove a source of rights to which an Act of Parliament has given effect, even 77 Craig (n 9) 1061-62; Phillipson (n 12) 1084. if the removal of that source is consistent with that Act of Parliament. Here is the main reason for this conclusion:
We cannot accept that a major change to UK constitutional arrangements can be achieved by ministers alone; it must be effected in the only way that the UK constitution recognises, namely by Parliamentary legislation. This conclusion appears to us to follow from the ordinary application of basic concepts of constitutional law.
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No authority was offered in support of this proposition, and apart from their discussion of the principle of legality, which we will see is contestable in this context, the majority provided no justification for curtailing the prerogative power in this way. As Lord Carnwath said in dissent, the court was 'shown no authority to support a rule as so stated, nor any principled basis for the court to invent it.' 83 One aspect of the majority's claim ought to be uncontroversial: withdrawing from the EU will be a major constitutional change. Yet this point was rejected by Lord Reed. 84 His Lordship objected to the majority's description of the 1972 Act as having 'a constitutional character' due to its creation of 'an entirely new, independent and overriding source of domestic law'. 85 It is true, as the majority and the minority acknowledged, that EU law is not an ultimate source of law, because its validity as a source of domestic law depends on a different source of law, namely an Act of Parliament. 86 In that sense-and only that sense-it is not an 'independent' source of law as the majority described it, though of course it is an independent source in the sense-misleadingly described by the majority as 'a more fundamental sense' and 'a more realistic sense' (I would rather say merely a different sense)-that it is the EU institutions, not Parliament, that make and change EU law. But Lord Reed went further and argued that recognition of the validity of EU law in domestic law 'does not alter any fundamental principle of our constitution.' 88 The majority was right to reject this objection. Indeed, withdrawal from the EU will be a more fundamental change in our constitution than even the majority acknowledged. The majority rejected the claim that there had been any change to 'the socalled fundamental rule of recognition'. 89 The 'rule of recognition' was the term used by HLA Hart, the pre-eminent legal philosopher of the twentieth century, in his ground-breaking account of a legal system's ultimate criteria of legal validity. 90 The UK's rule of recognition includes the legal supremacy of Acts of Parliament (or parliamentary sovereignty): what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law. While EU law owes its validity as a source of domestic law to an Act of Parliament, the parliamentary and judicial recognition of the doctrine of the primacy of EU law has changed the ultimate criteria of legal validity. 91 This fundamental constitutional change was not made by Parliament on its own, when it enacted section 2(4) of the 1972 Act. The rule of recognition is determined by the acceptance of lawapplying officials, especially judges.
92 But the constitutional change brought about by this acceptance among officials will inevitably be reversed following either the express repeal of the 1972 Act or the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.
Thus, we can accept the majority's argument that there is a difference-perhaps even what they called a 'vital difference'-between, on the one hand, changing domestic law by contributing to changes in EU law and, on the other, withdrawing from the EU, thereby removing EU law as an overriding source of domestic law: the latter would result in 'a fundamental change in the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom.' 93 Put differently, withdrawal from the EU will be a change that is 'different not just in degree but in kind from the abrogation of particular rights, duties or rules derived from EU law.'
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But the nature of this constitutional change does not by itself justify the majority's conclusion that, while there is a prerogative power to contribute to the EU law-making process, there is no prerogative power to leave the EU. 95 It remains the case that the effect given to EU law as a source of domestic law is 'inherently contingent on the UK's continued membership of the EU', and there is no statutory limit on the use of the prerogative to withdraw. 96 The majority, relying on the Simms principle of legality, argued that the court will require statutory authorisation by express language, or necessary implication, before it will infer that ministers have a 'farreaching and anomalous right to use a treaty-making power to remove an important source of domestic law and important domestic rights.'
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As the 1972 Act and later statutes were silent on that power, it did not exist.
Strikingly, Lord Reed relied on the very same kind of reasoning to reach exactly the opposite conclusion. Starting from the premise that 'it is a basic principle of our constitution that the conduct of foreign affairs, including the ratification of treaties, falls within the prerogative powers of the Crown', Lord Reed argued that this principle 'is so fundamental that it can only be overridden by express provision or necessary implication.'
98 As the 1972 Act and later statutes were silent on the prerogative power to withdraw, it continued to exist.
Both the majority and the minority failed to see that the silence of the 1972 Act calls for creative constitutional adjudication, in which the question is whether the common law should be developed to recognise a constraint on the prerogative in this context. 99 But, as noted at the outset of this article, judges have the power to develop the law where it is silent or indeterminate, making both the majority and the minority's decisions constitutionally permissible. 100 In such circumstances, not intervening may be considered to be just as 'activist', or creative, as intervening. 101 We can accept the majority's decision only if we can explain why it would be morally or politically illegitimate for the executive to have the power to withdraw from the EU without parliamentary authorisation.
VII. CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE DECISIONS
Opening the door to the question of the legitimacy of a prerogative power to trigger Article 50, we are faced with a broad range of considerations. There are considerations that go to the question of whether the decision can legitimately be made by the executive or only by Parliament. And then there are considerations that go to the question of whether it is right for the court to intervene to make parliamentary authorisation a legal requirement.
Once the question is posed, 'Who should make the decision to withdraw from the EU?', the answer may seem obvious: Parliament should decide, and maybe the people in a referendum, but certainly not the executive. On this simple view, the executive cannot have the legitimate authority to make this decision, because if it did then it would have been open to the executive, at any time on or after 2 January 1972, to withdraw from the EU Treaties without parliamentary authorisation, even if there had been no referendum or if a referendum had resulted in a vote to remain. The majority described these as 'implausible propositions', and used them to highlight the 'improbability of the Secretary of State's case '. 102 This simple view is too simplistic. The improbability is that the executive would decide to withdraw in the absence of a referendum, or in the face of a vote to remain, but this improbability is no reason 99 cf Phillipson (n 12) 1082 (emphasis in original).
for denying the existence of that power. If, implausibly, the executive had attempted to use its power in this way, it would have been accountable to the courts through judicial review and to Parliament through the convention of ministerial responsibility. The majority was highly dismissive of both forms of accountability: they described the availability of judicial review as 'rather a bold suggestion' given the traditional view that 'prerogative treaty-making powers are not subject to judicial review'; and they described the relevance of the executive's accountability to Parliament as 'a potentially controversial argument constitutionally', because it 'would justify all sorts of powers being accorded to the executive'.
103 Both objections are well wide of the mark.
The majority considered themselves able to intervene in Miller because they were concerned with the existence, or scope, of the prerogative power, rather than its exercise. The latter is no longer considered immune from judicial review, though the courts are often reluctant to intervene, especially in the exercise of the treaty-making prerogative.
104 During the hearing, Lord Reed suggested that, if the question is about the exercise, rather than the existence, of the prerogative-that is, about whether the executive has abused its power, rather than exceeded it-then the referendum result would become a relevant consideration.
105 Lord Pannick QC agreed: 'Once we are into questions of abuse … the court will plainly give the broadest of discretion, and that is not our case.' power. In the context of the Miller case, Timothy Endicott has provided a good analysis of the justification of executive authority, and the need for, as Blackstone put it, 'unity, strength and dispatch' in the executive function.
107 A variety of considerations are relevant, including the referendum result and the executive's accountability to Parliament.
108
The referendum result may be thought to be especially relevant, and it is not just the tabloid journalists quoted earlier who take this view. 109 The referendum itself is not a source of law and cannot be legally binding unless an Act of Parliament makes it legally binding. The EU Referendum Act 2015, unlike other legislation establishing referendums, 110 imposed no duty on the government to implement the result. But the court could have held that the referendum was a relevant consideration, which, in effect, gave the government the legitimate authority to decide to trigger Article 50.
111
Yet there is much disagreement about the respective merits of direct democracy and representative democracy. The primacy of the latter in the traditional understanding of the UK constitution led the House of Lords Constitution Committee to conclude that it would be 'constitutionally inappropriate' for the executive to act on an advisory referendum without explicit parliamentary approval.
112 Although the Constitution Committee said nothing to justify (and much to contradict) its conclusion that it would be constitutionally inappropriate, 113 there is certainly a strong argument for the conclusion that, in view of the importance-indeed, the constitutional importance-of withdrawing from the EU, in a representative democracy this decision ought to be made by Parliament.
These of course do not exhaust the considerations relevant to the question whether the executive has legitimate authority to trigger Article 50, but they are illustrative. My point here is that, whether you agree with the majority or the minority in Miller, the decision must be justified on the basis of considerations such as these. It cannot be justified by constitutional requirements, for each decision was constitutionally permissible until the majority made parliamentary authorisation a requirement.
VIII. LAW, CONVENTION, AND DEVOLUTION
If the UK's constitution is as flexible as this suggests, was it also open to the Supreme Court to decide whether the consent of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly is required before Article 50 is triggered? The requirement to seek the consent of these devolved legislatures when legislation affects devolved matters-a requirement known as the 'Sewel convention'-has always been understood to be a 'political restriction', unenforceable by a court.
114 But the Lord Advocate on behalf of the Scottish Government, the Counsel General for Wales, and the Attorney General for Northern Ireland, argued that the convention should now be interpreted and applied by the court. If accepted, this argument would undoubtedly have been by far the most significant and far-reaching part of the case. But the Supreme Court unanimously-and, in my view, rightly-rejected the argument. 113 The Committee accepted that there is no constitutional convention to that effect, and it expressed no view on whether parliamentary involvement is a legal requirement: ibid paras 16 and 22. 122 Of course, a statement or a Memorandum of Understanding does not make a convention. But there is strong evidence that a convention to this effect has developed, not only for legislation on devolved matters, but also for legislation that alters the competence of the devolved institutions, at least in Scotland and Wales.
The disagreement about whether the consent of the devolved legislatures is necessary before triggering Article 50 is evidence that the convention is indeterminate on that question. What we have are competing political claims, but no conventional rule that can settle the matter. There is not only a lack of general acceptance on this point, but also a lack of settled practice. Importantly, as the Supreme Court noted in the Miller case, 'legislation which implements changes to the competences of EU institutions and thereby affects devolved competencies … has not been the subject of legislative consent motions in any devolved legislature.' 123 Given these features of constitutional conventions in general, and the Sewel convention in particular, the Supreme Court in Miller was therefore right to maintain the orthodox position on their nonjusticiability: 'Judges,' they said, 'are neither the parents nor the guardians of political conventions; they are merely observers. considerations such as constitutional conventions, 126 which have never been directly legally enforceable. 127 Two objections to the Supreme Court's judgment on this point have been raised, however. First, Article 50(1), you will recall, states that the decision to withdraw from the EU must be 'in accordance with the Member State's own constitutional requirements'. It was argued that this provision required the court to determine what all the constitutional requirements are, including the conventional ones. This argument was clearly flawed, so much so that the Supreme Court did not even discuss it. Article 50(1) did not confer jurisdiction on the courts to assume the role of guardians of the whole constitution, including its political conventions. To the extent that conventions are political requirements, they are requirements enforced by the officials whose behaviour determines their content.
Secondly, in 2016 the Scotland Act 1998 was amended to include a new section 28(8), which states that 'it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.' It was argued that this legislative recognition of the Sewel convention turned it into a legal rule that the courts could interpret. The main problem with this argument, however, is that the subsection is clearly declaratory of an existing practice ('it is recognised'), and explicitly incorporates the vagueness of Lord Sewel's statement and the Memorandum of Understanding ('will not normally'). As the Supreme Court pointed out, this language-in the majority's words, 'recognising the convention for what it is, namely a political convention'-is hardly indicative of a legislative intention to turn the convention into a legal rule justiciable by the courts. 128 Legislation that does not create a legal rule may seem odd, but it is more common than you might think.
129
The Supreme Court went on to say, in a remark that called for (but did not receive) further explanation, that 'the purpose of the legislative recognition of the convention was to entrench it as a convention.'
130 Aside from acknowledging a pre-existing convention, the purpose of the legal recognition is unclear. But its effect is clear enough: it changed nothing. The convention remains just what it was before its recognition in statute, because the Sewel convention's nonjusticiability 'follows from the nature of its content'.
131 Its content, as discussed above, is determined by the behaviour of the officials who are subject to the rule, and where there is disagreement, only political argument can settle what should happen.
The legal supremacy of Acts of Parliament provides a further reason for the court to avoid interpreting, let alone enforcing, the Sewel convention. We must emphasise that the submissions from the devolved institutions did not challenge the UK Parliament's legislative supremacy.
132 They were not questioning the validity of any statute authorising the triggering of Article 50 without the consent of the devolved legislatures. Yet they were asking the court to rule that the constitutional requirements for the purposes of Article 50(1) include the legislative consent of the devolved institutions. The effect of such a ruling, despite their claims to the contrary, would have been inconsistent with Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, which prohibits courts from questioning parliamentary proceedings. 133 Moreover, if the court had held that the Sewel convention is a constitutional requirement, the effect of that ruling would have been purely political, given the continuing commitment to the legislative supremacy of the UK parliament, a constitutional requirement that overrides the lack of devolved consent. That provides yet another reason why the Supreme Court was right not to be drawn into the politics of devolution.
There is an irony in seeking to use the Sewel convention as an obstacle to a process-the UK's withdrawal from the EU-that will, as the majority in Miller noted, 'enhance the devolved competence '. 134 This use of the Sewel convention is in one respect a reversal of another attempt to constrain the authority of the Crown-in-Parliament in order to protect Scots law. Article XVIII of the Acts of Union of 1706 and 1707, part of which was cited in support of the majority's conclusion that an Act of Parliament was legally required for the UK to withdraw from the EU, 135 was used in the 1970s-unsuccessfully-to challenge the UK's accession to the EEC and the validity of the 1972 Act. 136 Article XVIII states that 'no alteration be made in Laws which concern private Right except for evident utility of the subjects within Scotland.' This, like the Sewel convention, has the purpose of protecting Scotland's distinct legal identity. But the principles beneath these two provisions-that changes to Scots law should be for the 'evident utility' of subjects in Scotland and, if on a devolved matter or altering the competence of the devolved legislature, should be made with the Scottish Parliament's consent-could each be invoked to challenge EU laws as much as UK laws. Yet, as already mentioned, the Sewel convention has not been used in that way. 137 In so far as withdrawal from the EU will remove rights that are within the competence of the Scottish Parliament, it will be open to the Scottish Parliament to enact new rights, replicating EU rights if it wishes. The Scottish Parliament will have more control over those matters than it currently does. If people want to preserve and develop Scots law's distinctiveness from English law, we might expect them similarly to want to preserve and develop its distinctiveness from the law of the EU. 138 134 ibid [130] . 135 The majority quoted that part of Article XVIII that states that the laws of Scotland are 'alterable by the Parliament of Great Britain': ibid [44] . The majority did not quote the part that follows in the text. it did following the UK's acceptance of the doctrine of EU law supremacy-but it changes only when there is a change in the practice of those who use the rule of recognition and tacitly presuppose its existence. Nothing in the devolution arrangements has had that effect.
For all these reasons, the Supreme Court was right to conclude that the Sewel convention is not a legal rule justiciable by the court. More than most, ours is a flexible constitution, and the judges are not its guardians. Judges are the guardians of the rule of law, and it is in that capacity that they determined whether Her Majesty's Government had a prerogative power to trigger Article 50. The fact that, as I have argued, the law was indeterminate on that question, and that the court was therefore required to turn to extra-legal considerations, does not entail that the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on non-legal rules generally.
IX. PARLIAMENT AND THE JUDICIARY
The myth of Miller is that the majority defended established constitutional principles, safeguarding the balance of power between the executive and the sovereign Parliament.
143 This is a myth because the balance of power was not in doubt: there was no challenge to Parliament's legislative supremacy. 144 There is no doubt that, as in the Fire Brigades Union case, Parliament could have asserted its authority itself. It was open to Parliament, at any time before or after the referendum on 23 June 2016, to enact a statute requiring the government to seek parliamentary authorisation before triggering Article 50. Parliament did not need the judiciary to come to its defence.
In my view, it was right that Parliament should make this decision. A decision as momentous as the decision to withdraw from the EU should be made not by the government in the exercise of its royal prerogative, nor by the voters in a referendum, but by Parliament 145 There is much in this argument, though, not surprisingly, it was not a popular one among MPs.
But was it right for the Supreme Court to make parliamentary authorisation a legal requirement? The creative element of constitutional adjudication in this case may lead some to suspect that a democratic objection may be relevant. For democratic objections can be levelled not only against rights-based constitutional review, but also against structural constitutional review. 146 However, even if such objections are sound, this kind of structural constitutional adjudication is less significant in a system such as ours that continues to recognise the legal supremacy of Acts of Parliament-in contrast with a federal system-because it is always open to Parliament to legislate.
The arguments for and against the court's intervention in Miller were more finely balanced than both sides admit. But one practical argument is worth highlighting. Although it was always open to Parliament to make its voice heard and legislate, MPs, fearful of their constituents' reactions, were reluctant to insist that parliamentary authorisation was necessary before the government could start the process of withdrawing. In other words, the parliamentary will to legislate in the face of the referendum result was lacking. Whatever your view on the merits of the Miller judgment, we should regret the image of a Parliament that is unwilling to assert its authority without the impetus of the judiciary.
